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David Blackwell was born 80 years ago in Centralia, Illinois. He gradu-
ated from high school at the age of 16 and enrolled at the University of
Illinois with the intention of becoming an elementary school teacher. This
as we now know was not to be. The schoolboy’s loss is the scholars gain.
He went on to obtain a Ph.D., a fellowship at the fabled Institute for
Advanced Studies, and ﬁnally retiring, but only in the legal sense, as
Professor of Statistics at the University of California.
In spite of his many mathematical accomplishments, Blackwell confesses
to have no interest in research. To quote him directly:
‘‘Basically, I’m not interested in doing research and I never have been, I’m
interested in understanding, which is quite a different thing.’’
From the acorn of such modest intentions have sprung mighty oaks. This
special issue of Games and Economic Beha¨ior pays tribute to them by
gathering together papers that are branches of two of Blackwell’s oaks:
approachability and merging. Blackwell’s approachability theorem can be
viewed as a generalization of the minimax theorem of zero-sum games to
matrix games with vector payoffs. While interesting in its own right, what is
remarkable are its applications to forecasting and learning in games. One
set of contributions to this special issue advances the modern theory of
forecasting and learning in games, and explores the connection of these
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results to Blackwell’s approachability theorem. The second of Blackwell’s
oaks is the merging of opinions. Merging is a precise formulation of the
following basic question: when do different individuals with different
priors but sharing the same data agree about their posteriors? The second
set of contributions to this special issue explores the merging of opinions
between different players in a game. Remarkably, it turns out also that the
merging of opinions has a strong connection to calibrated learning, which
in turn rests on Blackwell’s ﬁrst oak. So it seems an entirely ﬁtting tribute
to David Blackwell to dedicate this special issue of Games and Economic
Beha¨ior devoted to forecasting, learning, and merging of opinions in
games to him.
To illustrate the application of the approachability theorem to forecast-
ing and learning, consider the problem of repeatedly predicting the out-
come of a coin toss. One’s performance will be measured by the fraction of
correct predictions. Sans knowledge of the process that governs the out-
come on each round, how well can one do? An obvious solution is to
predict HEADS in each round with probability a half. In the limit, at least
50% of ones predictions will be correct. Can one do better? Surprisingly,
yes. The approachability theorem yields a randomized method that pro-
. duces a fraction of correct predictions, fnwith the following property,
fnG max hn,1y hn y en, 4 . . . .
. . where en goes to zero almost surely as n goes to inﬁnity. Here hn is
the fraction of HEADS realized in the ﬁrst n rounds.
The coin problem considered above is a special case of what computer
scientists would call the on-line decision problem. In each period an action
is chosen, a signal observed, and a utility received as a function of the
action and signal. The problem is to try to forecast the signal, so as to
choose the optimal action. Historical values of the actions and signals may
be used to ‘‘learn’’ what the forthcoming signal will be.
The weakest useful criterion for successful long-run learning is that of
universal consistency in learning. This considers simple empirical frequen-
cies. That is, a learning rule is universally consistent if it is approximately
optimal in the long run against the true empirical frequencies. The
existence of such rules was ﬁrst established in the mid 1950s by James
.  . Hannan 1957 . Subsequently Blackwell 1956a derived it as an applica-
. tion of his approachability theorem Blackwell 1956b . This result of
Hannan’s was lost and rediscovered several times, as Foster and Vohra
explain in ‘‘Regret in the On-Line Decision Problem.’’ The Hannan result
admits considerable further generalization. Rustichini, in ‘‘Minimizing
Regret: the General Case’’ uses approachability, to extend the result to the
case when players receive an indirect signal about their payoffs at eachINTRODUCTION 3
round. In ‘‘Adaptive Game Playing using Multiplicative Weights’’ by
Freund and Schapire the Hannan theorem is revisited using an algorithm
much studied in the computer science literature. They provide a simple
learning algorithm with convergence bounds that hold for any ﬁnite number
of rounds. Further, they establish in a certain sense that no adaptive
procedure for playing a game can have a better rate of convergence.
A criterion stronger than universal consistency is that of calibration with
respect to own forecasts. In the coin ﬂipping example, suppose in each
round one predicts the probability of observing heads. Calibration means
that on those occasions when a probability p of HEADS was announced,
HEADS should have been realized in a proportion p of those periods.
Rules satisfying this stronger property were ﬁrst described by Foster and
. . Vohra 1998 . Moreover, Foster and Vohra 1997 showed that when all
players follow universally calibrated rules, play converges in the long-run
time average sense to the set of correlated equilibria. Because of the
importance of this result, several variations are considered in this volume.
Two simple universally calibrated algorithms together with simple proofs,
are in Foster ‘‘A Proof of Calibration via Blackwell’s Approachability
Theorem,’’ and in Fudenberg and Levine ‘‘An Easier Way to Calibrate.’’
The former is particularly interesting, because it shows that Blackwell’s
approachability method can be used to establish calibration results as well
as universal consistency results. Fudenberg and Levine, by contrast, give a
direct algebraic proof. A broad overview of the literature on calibration
and the related literature on the on-line decision problem in computer
science is in Foster and Vohra’s ‘‘Regret and the Online Decision Prob-
lem.’’ Finally, Fudenberg and Levine ‘‘Conditional Universal Consistency’’
consider a relatively simple variation on ﬁctitious play, and show how it
may be universally calibrated with respect to a much broader class of
‘‘conditional’’ checking rules. Basically, these checking rules require cali-
bration conditional on prespeciﬁed events, such as the previous period
realization of the random variable. These conditional checking rules also
play an important role in connecting calibrated learning with merging as
Kalai et al. show in ‘‘Calibrated Forecasting and Merging.’’
In addition to the papers appearing in this volume, there is other work
. on calibration. Hart and Mas-Colell 1997 use Blackwell’s approachability
criterion to show that a simple regret based procedure is universally
. consistent. Fudenberg and Levine 1998 give a general method of convert-
ing any universally consistent procedure to a universally calibrated proce-
dure. Hart and Mas-Colell add two innovations to this: ﬁrst, they observe
that the eigenvector problem Fudenberg and Levine propose to solve at
every step can be replaced with a simple multiplication of the matrix times
the previously chosen probabilities of actions. Second, they simplify this to
playing actions in proportion to past regret. This loses the property ofINTRODUCTION 4
universal calibration, but at least if everyone plays this way, all are
calibrated, and play in the long-run time average sense converges to the
set of correlated equilibria.
. A second paper on calibration is Lehrer’s 1997 ‘‘Any Inspection is
Manipulable.’’ This paper makes two contributions. The ﬁrst is a general-
ization of the approachability theorem to inﬁnite-dimensional spaces. The
second is to apply the theorem to derive forecasting procedures that pass
simultaneously any countable collection of history dependent checking
rules. History based checking rules are restricted to using the previous
sequence of outcomes to specify what future events will be checked for
calibration. This is a generalization of the Fudenberg and Levine result
that considers only particular countable classes of history-dependent
. checking rules. A third paper, by Sandroni et al. 1999 , ‘‘Calibration with
Many Checking Rules,’’ extends this result to include forecast based
checking rules. Forecast based checking rules use the previous history of
forecasts to specify what future events will be checked.
The second of Blackwell’s oaks is merging. As we indicated above,
merging is a precise formulation of the following basic question: when do
different individuals with different priors but sharing the same data agree
. about their posteriors? Blackwell and Dubins 1962 showed that merging
occurs when the priors are absolutely continuous with respect to each
other; roughly speaking, they assume that the support of the individuals
priors must be the same. In ‘‘Calibrated Forecasting and Merging’’ by
Kalai et al. this criterion for merging is shown to be equivalent to the
notion of calibration with respect to checking rules. The idea of calibration
is to compare empirical frequencies with theoretical probabilities. A check-
ing rule speciﬁes the events for which the frequencies should be checked.
This paper closes the circle between the two of Blackwell’s oaks.
The fact that in an inﬁnite parameter space there is no single measure
that all other measures are absolutely continuous with respect to has
important consequences for learning. These are made precise in Miller
and Sanchirico in ‘‘The Role of Absolute Continuity in Merging of
Opinions.’’
In his paper ‘‘Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incom-
plete Information,’’ Sylvain Sorin, uses merging to pour new wine into old
bottles. He uses the result of Blackwell and Dubins and their reﬁnements
due to Kalai and Lehrer to characterize the equilibria of two-person
repeated games with incomplete information and known own payoffs. This
paper shows how the modern literature on learning is closely connected to
the earlier literature on reputation, in which an impatient player is
manipulated by a more patient player who exploits the equilibrium learn-
ing procedure of the less patient player.INTRODUCTION 5
Many of the procedures inspired by considerations of calibration and
merging can be motivated by appeals to stimulus response models of
learning and behavior. In Rustichini ‘‘Optimal Properties of Stimulus
Response Learning Models,’’ two very broad classes of stimulus response
type procedures are considered. The paper gives a precise characterization
of when procedures of each type converge to optimality in terms of the
information available to the players.
The calibration and learning papers study the theoretical properties of
calibration and learning procedures. Of equal importance are how the
procedures behave dynamically. One set of results we have already men-
tioned is the convergence of calibrated procedures to correlated equilib-
rium. The remaining contributions in this issue address other dynamic
issues.
The paper by Michel Benaim and Morris Hirsch entitled ‘‘Mixed Equi-
libria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Fictitious Play in Perturbed
Games,’’ studies the behavior of ﬁctitious play for inﬁnitely repeated
games of incomplete information with randomly perturbed payoffs. The
study of such games was motivated by a desire to provide a justiﬁcation for
mixed strategy equilibria. This paper uses developments in dynamical
systems and stochastic approximation theory to study the limit set of the
dynamic process induced by ﬁctitious play in several classes of such games.
One of the ﬁrst and most well-known rules for repeated game playing is
best response. In ‘‘A Note on Best Response Dynamics,’’ Edward Hopkins
studies the relationship between the continuous time best response dy-
namic, its perturbed version, and evolutionary dynamics in relation to
mixed strategy equilibria. He shows that a variety of learning dynamics
when aggregated over a large population of players, can be approximated
in continuous time by adjustments in the direction of a positive deﬁnite
matrix times the payoff vector. He calls these dynamics ‘‘positive deﬁnite
adjustment’’ or PDA dynamics. Under these dynamics he shows that if the
payoff matrix is negative deﬁnite a fully mixed equilibrium is stable; if it is
positive deﬁnite, it is unstable.
The paper by Abraham Neyman and Daijiro Okada entitled ‘‘Strategic
Entropy and Complexity in Repeated Games’’ brings to the study of
bounded rationality ideas from yet another subject that has been close to
David Blackwell’s heart: Information Theory. Different communities of
scholars have proposed different restrictions on rationality as models of
bounded rationality. Computer scientists use the language of ﬁnite state
automata and complexity theory. Statisticians limit the class of probabilis-
tic models the players might believe. Experimental game theorist’s appeal
to ﬁndings on the cognitive missteps made by humans. Alas, these restric-
tions live in different types of spaces. How can we compare them, or work
with more than one restriction at a time? Okada and Neymann suggestINTRODUCTION 6
that one consider the entropy of the strategies implied by the restrictions.
They provide theorems that use this entropy of the strategies to predict the
outcome in terms of payoff of the repeated game.
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